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JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO ENFORCE THE
FEDERAL FALSE STATEMENT STATUTE
IN INVESTIGATORY SITUATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The false statement statute, section 1001 of the federal criminal
code, 1 prohibits the making of false statements to any department or
agency of the United States in any matter within their jurisdiction. 2
Because of the broad language of the statute, and the broad construc-
tion given it by the Supreme Court, 3 section 1001 has been applied to
a myriad of situations. 4 For example, the statute has been employed
against offenses ranging from false written statements filed with fed-
eral regulatory agencies 5 to false oral statements made to Customs
officials at airports. 6 Notwithstanding this breadth, some courts have
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). Section 1001 provides in full:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or
covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses
any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id.
2. Id.
3. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70 (1969) ("[W]e think the term
'jurisdiction' should not be given a narrow or technical meaning for purposes of §
1001 .... ); United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1955) ("[T]hat
criminal statutes are to be construed strictly ... does not mean that every criminal
statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning ...."); United States v.
Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941) ("We see no reason why [the broad] intention [of
Congress] should be frustrated by construction.").
4. E.g., Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 65 (1969) (false statement to
NLRB); United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 504 (1955) (false statement to
Disbursing Office of House of Representatives); United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S.
86, 89-90 (1941) (construing predecessor to § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 80 (1940)) (false
statement to Federal Tender Board); United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917, 919 (2d
Cir.) (false statement to FBI), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967); United States v.
McCue, 301 F.2d 452, 453 (2d Cir.) (false statement to IRS), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
939 (1962); Pitts v. United States, 263 F.2d 353, 353-54 (9th Cir.) (false statement to
Atomic Energy Commission), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 935 (1959); United States v.
Blake, 206 F. Supp. 706, 706-07 (W.D. Mo. 1962) (false statement to U.S. Postal
Service), aff'd, 323 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Ganz, 48 F. Supp. 323,
323-24 (D. Mass. 1942) (construing predecessor to § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 80 (1940))
(false statement to Office of Price Administration).
5. E.g., United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1941) (construing prede-
cessor to § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 80 (1940)) (false statement to Federal Tender Board);
Pitts v. United States, 263 F.2d 353, 353-54 (9th Cir.) (false statement to Atomic
Energy Commission), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 935 (1959).
6. E.g., United States v. Cutaia, 511 F. Supp. 619, 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);
United States v. Pereira, 463 F. Supp. 481, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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interpreted the statute narrowly, holding that false statements made
to federal investigative agencies are not within the scope of the stat-
ute.
7
The judicial reluctance to enforce section 1001 has been manifested
in cases falling into three theoretical categories. The first of these
categories is amorphous; the decisions have been based upon no single
rationale.8 They have been grounded upon the courts' belief that
application of the statute in the particular circumstance would be
unfair, such as when the government has improperly elicited a false
statement. 9 They represent appropriate exercises of judicial discretion
and the implementation of the maxim that criminal statutes are to be
strictly construed.10
The second category of cases is based upon a very narrow construc-
tion of the term "jurisdiction" or "agency." Several courts have held,
7. E.g., United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 901 (5th Cir. 1982) (false
statement to IRS on income tax return); United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d
1208, 1214 (5th Cir. 1978) (false statement to Customs officials); United States v.
Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1974) (false statements to IRS during special
investigation); Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 368 (8th Cir. 1967) (false
complaints to FBI); Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 300, 305 (5th Cir.
1962) (false statements to IRS during special investigation); United States v. Thevis,
469 F. Supp. 490, 514 (D. Conn.) (false exculpatory statements to FBI), aff'd mem.,
614 F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v.
Ehrlichman, 379 F. Supp. 291, 292 (D.D.C. 1974) (false statements to FBI during
informal interview); United States v. Philippe, 173 F. Supp. 582, 584 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (false statements to IRS during special investigation), overruled, United States
v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962); United States v.
Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (false statement to FBI during
informal interview); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 208 (D. Md. 1955)
(false statement to FBI while under oath); United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88,
90-91 (D. Colo. 1953) (false statement to FBI).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Cowden, 677 F.2d 417, 420-21 (8th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1960). These courts, without
employing reasoning that would exclude specific categories of statements from the
scope of § 1001, have nevertheless refused to apply the statute to the facts before
them. Thus, the Cowden court held that an immediately retracted false statement to
an agent of the Customs Department was not "material" for the purposes of § 1001.
677 F.2d at 420-21. In Stofjey, by contrast, the court held that false statements made
during a five-hour interrogation by a defendant who was "for all practical pur-
poses ... under arrest," were not within the scope of § 1001. 279 F.2d at 927-28.
9. E.g., United States v. Cowden, 677 F.2d 417, 420-21 (8th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1960). While the Cowden court
based its reversal on the rationale that the statement was not "material" for the
purposes of § 1001, 677 F.2d at 420-21, the court so held because it felt that the
government's conduct in eliciting the statement was "manifestly unfair." Id. Simi-
larly, the Stoffey court held that the false statements before it were not within the
scope of § 1001 because the agents to whom they were made were improperly seeking
admissions of guilt rather than information. 279 F.2d at 927-28.
10. Williams v. United States, 102 S. Ct. 3088, 3095 (1982); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); 3 C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory
Construction. § 59.03, at 6-8 (4th ed. 1974).
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for example, that because the power to make a final disposition of a
matter being investigated is vested in the judiciary," a criminal inves-
tigation is not a matter within the "jurisdiction" of the FBI, as that
term is used in section 1001. The FBI is therefore not an "agency" to
which the statute is applicable.
The most clearly defined category of decisions is that which applies
the "exculpatory no" doctrine to replies to questions of federal investi-
gators. 12 This doctrine provides that an " 'exculpatory no' answer
without any affirmative, aggressive or overt misstatement on the part
of the defendant" is not a "statement" for the purposes of section
1001.13 Despite the apparently limited reach of the exculpatory no
doctrine, some courts have given the doctrine a broad application.
Thus, responses made by anyone suspected of criminal activity have
been excluded from the scope of section 1001, regardless of whether
they were technically exculpatory 14 or made during an investigation. 15
Both the narrow interpretation of the term "jurisdiction" and the
exculpatory no doctrine depend upon overly narrow constructions of
the statutory language and of congressional intent.16 Underlying these
judicial exceptions, however, are legitimate concerns, expressed by
many courts, about the fairness of applying section 1001 in particular
situations. 17
Judicial reluctance to apply the statute in investigatory situations,
especially in those instances in which the response can be character-
11. E.g., United States v. Lambert, 470 F.2d 354, 357-60 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd
in part, aff'd in part on other grounds en banc, 501 F.2d 943, 946, 948 (5th Cir.
1974); Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 368 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 206-08 (D. Md. 1955).
12. E.g., United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 901 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1214 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bush,
503 F.2d 813, 818-19 (5th Cir. 1974); Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 305
(5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Thevis, 469 F. Supp. 490, 514 (D. Conn.), af'd
mem., 614 F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
13. Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 1962) (per curiam
denial of rehearing).
14. See United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978)
("possible self-incrimination at least in the minds of" defendants, exculpatory no
doctrine applied); United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1972) (false
statement of identification to FBI, exculpatory no doctrine applied).
15. See United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 899-901 (5th Cir. 1982) (ques-
tion in ordinary tax return deemed "investigative" for purposes of exculpatory no
doctrine).
16. See infra pt. II.
17. These concerns include criticisms that: 1) Compared to the perjury statute, §
1001 more severely punishes less serious behavior; 2) § 1001 is incompatible with the
fifth amendment; and 3) the statute may encourage improper law enforcement
procedure and criminalize trivial, inadvertent misbehavior. See infra pt. III.
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ized as an exculpatory denial, has influenced Congress 8 in its continu-
ing efforts to revise the federal criminal code.' 9 The Senate is presently
considering the enactment of a defense to prosecutions for false oral
exculpatory statements made to law enforcement officials. 20
This Note discusses the development and applications of the current
false statement statute. It then analyzes the technical and policy
arguments used to support refusals to enforce section 1001, particu-
larly those advanced by courts employing the exculpatory no doctrine.
The Note contends that the technical arguments are both incorrect
and unconvincing, and that while the fairness concerns merit serious
consideration, they should be addressed on a case-by-case basis, as is
18. E.g., Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on the Criminal Code Reform
Act of 1981, S. Rep. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 401-05 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Report]; House Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on the Criminal Code
Revision Act of 1980, H.R. Rep. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 178-79 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as House Report].
19. Numerous different revisions and replacements of title 18 have been intro-
duced in Congress, but none has met with the approval of both houses. Drinan,
Ward & Beier, The Federal Criminal Code: The Houses Are Divided, 18 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 509, 511-14 (1981); see Senate Report, supra note 18, at 1-18; House Report,
supra note 18, at 5-10.
20. S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1343, 127 Cong. Rec. 9916-17 (1981),
reprinted in Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the judiciary on S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12,544-45 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Senate Hearings]. This section provides in pertinent part:
§ 1343. Making a False Statement
(a) Offense.-A person commits an offense if-
"(1) in a government matter, he-
"(A) makes a material oral statement that he knows is false to a person
who he knows is-
"(i) a law enforcement officer; or
"(ii) a person assigned noncriminal investigative responsibility by statute,
or by a regulation, rule, or order issued pursuant thereto, or by the head of
a government agency;
and in fact such statement is volunteered or is made after the person has
been advised that making such aostatement is an offense;
(b) Defense.-It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(A)(i)
that the statement was made to a law enforcement officer during the course
of an investigation of an offense or a possible offense and the statement
consisted of a denial, unaccompanied by any other false statement, that the
declarant committed or participated in the commission of such offense.
Id. Although it does not provide an exculpatory denial defense, the House of Repre-
sentatives' proposed replacement for § 1001, H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1742,
126 Cong. Rec. 9718 (1980), reprinted in Revision of the Federal Criminal Code:
Hearings on Revision of the Federal Criminal Code Before the Subcomm. on Crimi-
nal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 6, at 5179-
80 (1982) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings], would eliminate oral statements
from the coverage of the statute. House Report, supra note 18, at 182. In other
sections of the House bill, however, certain oral false statements are made offenses:
[Vol. 51
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done in decisions falling into the first category. Alternately, certain
minor modifications of the statute currently being considered by Con-
gress2' would address these concerns without severely restricting the
scope of the statute. Continued judicial application of the exculpatory
no doctrine, however, or adoption of the doctrine by Congress, will
exclude from the scope of section 1001 entire categories of what are in
fact false statements within the meaning of the statute. Such exclusion
would seriously diminish the effectiveness of a useful part of the
federal criminal code.
I. THE STATUTE AND ITS JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. The Statute
Section 1001 is the direct descendant of a statute passed during the
Civil War to punish false claims made against the federal government
by members of the armed forces.22 The scope of the statute was
gradually expanded, 23 and in 1934 the present version, covering false
statements made in connection with "any matter within the jurisdic-
tion of any department or agency of the United States," 24 was en-
acted.25 Although the 1934 statute was intended primarily to apply to
false reports concerning the shipment of "hot oil" in violation of
federal regulations, 26 the Supreme Court has approved its application
in additional contexts.2 7
§ 1712 (misprison of felony); § 1714 (false implication of another); § 1744 (false
statement about emergencies). House Report, supra note 18, at 182.
21. See infra notes 100-01, 114-15 and accompanying text.
22. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 1, 12 Stat. 696 (currently codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001 (1976)).
23. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 5, § 5438, 18 Stat. 1054, 1060 (scope expanded from
military personnel to include "every person"); Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, § 35, 40
Stat. 1015, 1015-16 (scope expanded beyond coverage of United States Government
to include any corporation in which the government holds stock). See generally Note,
Fairness in Criminal Investigations Under The Federal False Statement Statute, 77
Colum. L. Rev. 316, 317 & nn. 5-10 (1977).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
25. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, § 35, 48 Stat. 996 (currently codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976)). Although changes were made in 1948, these
changes "were purely cosmetic except that the maximum term of imprisonment
under the section was reduced .... , "United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 823
n.4 (9th Cir. 1976), and the false claims provision of the statute was separated from
the false statement provision and became 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1976), while the false
statement statute became 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
26. The Supreme Court stated in 1941:
Legislation had been sought by the Secretary of the Interior to aid the
enforcement of laws relating to the functions of the Department of the
Interior and, in particular, to the enforcement of regulations under § 9(c) of
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 with respect to the transporta-
tion of "hot oil." The Secretary's effort was due, as he stated, to the lack of a
law under which prosecutions might be had "for the presentation of false
papers."
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Although the statute covers all government agencies, it has special
applicability in investigatory situations. It can be and has been uti-
lized as a means of prosecuting those suspected of major criminal
activity.2 1 The statute may also serve as a second charge in a criminal
prosecution. 29 Section 1001 can be particularly useful when the major
charge will not result in a conviction because of insufficient proof or a
strong defense.30
These uses are illustrated by a situation in which section 1001 has
been consistently employed. The Bank Secrecy Act makes it illegal for
a traveler to enter or leave the United States with more than $5000 in
currency without first submitting a report to the Treasury Depart-
ment.3 1 Suspect travelers have been questioned at airports as to
whether they were carrying amounts over the limit. When an ensuing
investigation has shown their responses to be false, they have been
arrested and charged with violations of the Bank Secrecy Act and/or
section 1001.32 Because conviction under the Bank Secrecy Act re-
United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1941) (footnotes omitted). Although
Gilliland provides perhaps the most detailed description of the legislative history of
the statute, the history itself has aptly been described as "scanty." United States v.
McCue, 301 F.2d 452, 454 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962).
27. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70-71 (1969) (false statement to NLRB,
conviction affirmed); United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955) (false
statement to Disbursing Office of House of Representatives, conviction affirmed); see'
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) ("in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States" (emphasis added)).
28. E.g., United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1976) (pharma-
cist illegally distributing controlled substances); Paternostro v. United States, 311
F.2d 298, 300-02 (5th Cir. 1962) (police corruption); United States v. Gomez-
Londono, 422 F. Supp. 519, 524-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (narcotics trafficking), rev'd on
other grounds, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977).
29. E.g., United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Moore, 638 F.2d 1171, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981); United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1210 (5th Cir. 1978); Pa-
ternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 300 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Cutaia, 511 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Gomez-Londono,
422 F. Supp. 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977).
30. E.g., United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc); Paternostro v. United
States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962). Paternostro was convicted under § 1001 for false
statements made to an IRS agent during an investigation into police corruption in
New Orleans, and under § 1621 for perjurious statements made before a grand jury
in the same matter. Id. at 300. The Fifth Circuit reversed the perjury conviction
because only one witness, without corroboration, testified as to the falsity of the
statements. Id. at 306.
31. 31 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976).
32. E.g., United States v. Cowden, 677 F.2d 417, 418 (8th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moore, 638
F.2d 1171, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); United States
v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 875 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Schnaiderman,
568 F.2d 1208, 1210 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cutaia, 511 F. Supp. 619, 623
(E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Pereira, 463 F. Supp. 481, 483-84 (E.D.N.Y.
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quires proof of a knowing violation of the Act's provisions, 33 and many
members of the public are unaware of these provisions due to insuffi-
cient warnings at airports, prosecution under the Act has not been
particularly successful. 34 In such a situation the section 1001 charge
may supply the conviction technically avoided on the Bank Secrecy
Act charge.
B. Judicial Reluctance to Enforce Section 1001
The Supreme Court has interpreted the language of section 1001 on
three occasions. 35 Although in these cases the Court did not consider
the application of the statute to false statements made during investi-
gations, it has stated unequivocally that section 1001 should be
broadly construed. 36
Notwithstanding this mandate from the Supreme Court, in one
context some courts refuse to find a false statement within the scope of
the statute. These courts hold that a false statement made to a federal
1978); United States v. Gomez-Londono, 422 F. Supp. 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977).
33. 31 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1976); see United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d
1208, 1211 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 925-26 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. Gomez-Londono, 422 F. Supp. 519, 522-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977).
34. See United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1210 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 924-26 (5th Cir. 1978).
The warning problem has been minimized to a large degree in the present customs
declaration form, 6059-B, which is distributed to travelers as they enter or leave the
country. The form advises a traveler that before he crosses the border he must declare
whether he is carrying more than $5000, and that failure to so declare is a crime. See
United States v. Cutaia, 511 F. Supp. 619, 622 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v.
Anderez, 502 F. Supp. 67, 68 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 661 F.2d
404 (9th Cir. 1981).
35. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969); United States v. Bramblett, 348
U.S. 503 (1955); United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941) (construing predeces-
sor of § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 80 (1940)).
36. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70 (1969); United States v. Bramblett,
348 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1955); United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941)
(construing precedessor of § 1001, 18 U.S.C. § 80 (1940)).
In Gilliland, the Court also held that the statute was not invalid for indefiniteness,
312 U.S. at 91, and that it could be successfully applied to an offense even when a
more specific statute directly applied. Id. at 95. The Gilliland Court also noted that
Congress, in amending an earlier version of the statute, had eliminated the require-
ment that the false statement at issue be made in connection with a claim against the
Government. Id. at 93. The Court next considered the statute in United States v.
Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955), which held that § 1001 applies to all three depart-
ments of the federal government. Id. at 504-08. In Bramblett the Court stated that
"[t]here is no indication in either the committee reports or in the congressional
debates that the scope of the statute was to be in any way restricted." Id. at 507
(footnotes omitted). Finally, in Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969), the
Court stated that: "Because there is a valid legislative interest in protecting the
integrity of official inquiries ...we think the term 'jurisdiction' should not be given
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investigator is not within the purview of section 1001. The first deci-
sion to so hold was in 1953 in United States v. Levin.37 The defendant
in Levin was indicted under section 1001 for making false statements
to an FBI agent concerning the ownership of a stolen emerald ring.
The district court dismissed the indictment, holding that the existence
of the general perjury statute, 38 and other statutes authorizing agents
of different departments and agencies to administer oaths when de-
sired, 39 negated the government's contention that section 1001 should
apply when the maker of the statement was under no legal duty to
speak. 40 The court found that such a duty to speak or to provide
information to the governmental agency with the authority to finally
dispose of the matter being investigated was required to avoid fla-
grantly unjust applications of the statute. 41
Two years after Levin, the district court in United States v. Stark ,42
presented with the same issue with respect to section 1001, reached
the same conclusion but on different grounds.43 The defendants in
Stark were indicted for false statements to FBI agents who were
investigating irregularities in mortgages insured by the Federal Hous-
ing Administration. 44 In contrast with the analysis employed by the
Levin court, the Stark court based its findings on a lengthy analysis of
the terms "statement" and "matter within the jurisdiction of" the FBI.
The court stated that the determination of whether a "statement"
was uttered must be made in light of the congressional purpose under-
lying section 1001. This purpose was found to be the protection of the
government from affirmative written or oral statements having the
tendency and effect of perverting the government's normal, proper
activities.45, The court concluded that the mere denial by the defend-
ants of knowledge of false payments, in the absence of both a volun-
tary statement or representation and a legal duty to speak, was not a
statement for purposes of section 1001. 41
The court then addressed the issue of whether the matter was
within the jurisdiction of the FBI. Although it found that the FBI was
a narrow or technical meaning for purposes of § 1001 ...... Id. at 70 (citations
omitted).
37. 133 F. Supp. 88 (D. Colo. 1953).
38. The perjury statute in force when Levin was decided was the Crimes and
Criminal Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 1621, 62 Stat. 683, 773-74 (1948)
(currently codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976)).
39. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 498 (1976) (investigators of Department of Interior); 18
U.S.C. § 4004 (1976) (wardens, superintendents and associate wardens of federal
penal institutions) and 19 U.S.C. § 1486 (1976) (employees of Customs Bureau).
40. 133 F. Supp. at 90-91.
41. Id.
42. 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).
43. Id. at 206.
44. Id. at 191.
45. Id. at 205.
46. Id. at 206.
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a department or agency within the meaning of section 1001, the court
ruled that the agency was not acting on a matter within its jurisdic-
tion.47 The court justified this finding by defining "jurisdiction" as the
"authority to decide and act" on the matter in question. 48 This author-
ity, according to the court, was reserved to the judiciary and not
vested in an investigatory agency. 49
Although both Levin and Stark articulated several of the arguments
later employed by courts to circumscribe the statute, the decisions
were contrary to existing appellate authority.50 In 1962, however, in
Paternostro v. United States,5' the Fifth Circuit formulated the clear-
est argument yet advanced against a section 1001 conviction-the
"exculpatory no" doctrine.
The defendant in Paternostro, a lieutenant in the New Orleans
Police Department, was questioned under oath by a special agent of
the Internal Revenue Service in connection with an investigation into
police corruption. A number of the defendant's answers were later
proven false, and he was convicted in the district court for violating
section 1001; the court of appeals reversed the conviction.52 In a
decison that remains the leading case for courts reluctant to apply the
statute,5 3 the Paternostro court adopted the reasoning of Levin and
Stark and from that reasoning formulated the exculpatory no doc-
trine. The court held that in an investigation initiated by an agent of
the government, an " 'exculpatory no' answer without any affirma-
tive, aggressive or overt misstatement on the part of the defendant
does not come within the scope of the statute." 
54
47. Id. at 207-08.
48. Id. at 206-07.
49. Id. at 207.
50. See Neely v. United States, 300 F.2d 67, 69-73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 864 (1962); Brandow v. United States, 268 F.2d 559, 564 (9th Cir. 1959);
Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 171-72 (10th Cir. 1955); Cohen v. United
States, 201 F.2d 386, 391-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 951 (1953); Marzani v.
United States, 168 F.2d 133, 137-38 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided Court, 335 U.S. 895 (1948).
51. 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962).
52. Id. at 300. The false statements at issue in Paternostro consisted of denials of
knowledge of the existence of an organized system of graft alleged to be operating in
the police department of New Orleans. Id. at 300 n.3. The opinion does not indicate
whether Paternostro himself was ever convicted of accepting any money, although
the government alleged that his statement, that he had never solicited money from
the operators of illegal businesses, was false. Id. at 300.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 899 (5th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1972); Friedman v. United States,
374 F.2d 363, 368-69 (8th Cir. 1967).
54. 311 F.2d at 309 (per curiam denial of rehearing).
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II. ARGUMENTS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Congressional Intent
Courts adopting limited constructions of section 1001 have main-
tained that Congress could not have intended the statute to apply to
false statements made to federal criminal investigators. 5 Some of
these courts suggest that the present version of section 1001 was passed
not to protect investigatory agencies but rather to ensure the accurate
flow of information to regulatory agencies. 56
In Friedman v. United States,57 for example, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that prosecution of the defendant under
section 1001 for his false statement to the FBI, alleging that he was
beaten by local police, 58 was not a matter within the jurisdiction of
that agency. 59 The Friedman court reasoned that the 1934 statute was
enacted to assist regulatory agencies, which, unlike investigatory
agencies, have the authority to make a final disposition of the matter
in question.60 The court stated that the FBI was not acting in a matter
within its jurisdiction because the power to make a final disposition on
the matter-the power to determine guilt or innocence-is ultimately
reserved to the judiciary.61 The FBI is therefore, according to the
55. See United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 900-01 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 178-83 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976);
United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bedore,
455 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1972); Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363,
366 (8th Cir. 1967); Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 302-05 (5th Cir.
1962); United States v. Thevis, 469 F. Supp. 490, 513 (D. Conn.), aff'd mern., 614
F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v.
Ehrlichman, 379 F. Supp. 291, 291-92 (D.D.C. 1974); United States v. Philippe, 173
F. Supp. 582, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), overruled, United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962); United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp.
175, 176-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 205-07 (D.
Md. 1955); United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88, 89-90 (D. Colo. 1953).
56. Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1967); United States
v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88, 89-90 (D. Colo. 1953); see United States v. Davey, 155 F.
Supp. 175, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
57. 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967).
58. Friedman and his lawyer voluntarily visited an office of the FBI in St. Louis
to initiate a federal investigation under the Civil Rights Laws against a Lieutenant
Maxey of the Missouri State Highway Patrol. Id. at 365. Friedman alleged that while
handcuffed and in custody on a state-law charge he was "struck, beaten, assaulted,
and severely injured and wounded by Lt. Maxey;" he then signed a written statement
containing this allegation. Id.
59. Id. at 369.
60. Id. at 367-68; accord United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 206-07 (D.
Md. 1955).
61. 374 F.2d at 367-68. The court stated: "It is in this more restrictive sense, we
believe Congress intended to use the word 'jurisdiction' in determining violations of
§ 1001." Id. at 368.
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Eighth Circuit, not an agency within the meaning of the statute;
neither is a criminal investigation a matter within its jurisdiction.62
This argument is inconsistent with the legislative history of section
1001 and the interpretation given the statute by the Supreme Court6 3
and by other federal courts.6 4 Congress never limited the application
of section 1001 to statements made to regulatory agencies. 65 Indeed,
the language of the statute-"in any matter within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency of the United States"-66-is sufficiently
broad to cover statements made to investigatory agencies. In Bryson v.
United States,67 the Supreme Court stated: "[W]e think the term
'jurisdiction' should not be given a narrow or technical meaning for
purposes of § 1001 ..... 68 The Second Circuit, presented in United
States v. Adler69 with a fact pattern similar to that of Friedman,70
explicitly rejected the latter's narrow interpretation of agency jurisdic-
tion, stating: "There is nothing to suggest, either in legislative history
or in the cases, that Congress in enacting § 1001 intended to conserve
the energies of only certain agencies." ' 7' Moreover, if the Friedman
interpretation of jurisdiction were accepted, the abuse at which the
original version of the statute was indisputably aimed-the submis-
sion of false reports required to be filed with federal agencies-would
not be covered, because such agencies have no power to "finally
dispose" of the matter. 72
62. Id. at 369.
63. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917, 922 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1006 (1967); Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964); United States v. White, 69 F. Supp. 562, 564 (S.D.
Cal. 1946); United States v. Sanders, 42 F. Supp. 436, 439-40 (S.D. Tex. 1941).
65. See, e.g., Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70-71 & n.10 (1969); United
States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955); United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S.
86, 93 (1941); United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917, 921-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1006 (1967); United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452, 454-55 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (emphasis added). See supra note 1.
67. 396 U.S. 64 (1969).
68. Id. at 70. The Court did state, however, that it had "no occasion in the
present context either to approve or disapprove Friedman's holding." Id. at 71 n. 10.
69. 380 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967).
70. Adler was the president of a construction company that was engaged in a
building project for the Navy. On his own initiative, Adler went to an office of the
FBI and complained that he was being forced by government officials to pay bribes
in the course of completing the contract. He later admitted that these allegations
were false and that he had made them to "get even" with the officials handling his
contract because they were giving him a "rough time" and he thought that an FBI
investigation would keep them "off his back." Id. at 919-20. See supra note 58.
71. 380 F.2d at 922.
72. The Secretary of the Interior, to whom the false reports were being submit-
ted, had no greater power than the FBI to "finally dispose" of, or punish, the
criminal act of making a false report. Disposal of that matter is reserved to the
judiciary.
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Section 1001 was originally intended to protect the government
against fraudulent claims. 73 Courts refusing to apply section 1001 to
false statements made to federal investigators have noted in their
reasoning that the statement in question did not constitute a claim. 74
That the sole purpose of the original statute was prevention of fraud
against the government is not relevant to these cases. The Supreme
Court resolved this issue in United States v. Gilliland7 . when it inter-
preted the 1934 revision of the statute, which had eliminated the
requirement that the false statement be made for the purpose of
"cheating and swindling" the government. 76 The Court stated: "In
this [amendment], there was no restriction to cases involving pecu-
niary or property loss to the government. '77
B. Willfulness
An essential element of any prosecution under section 1001 is that
the false statement in question be made willfully. 78 Implicit in the
reasoning of courts adopting narrow constructions of section 1001,
and those applying the exculpatory no doctrine, is the argument that a
nonaggressive reply to an investigative question is not willful for
purposes of section 1001. These courts refuse to find violations of
section 1001 when the false response was not an affirmative act calcu-
lated to pervert a function of government.7 9
This position was carried to its logical extreme in the Fifth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Schnaiderman.s0 Schnaiderman was con-
victed of violating both section 1001 and the Bank Secrecy Act. Vacat-
ing the section 1001 conviction, the court stated: "Schnaiderman did
not walk up to [the agent] and volunteer the statement, 'I am not
73. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
74. E.g., United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 935 (1976); United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1972); Paternostro v. United
States, 311 F.2d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 1962).
75. 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
76. Id. at 93. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
77. 312 U.S. at 93.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976); see United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 879
(10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1288 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Pereira, 463 F. Supp. 481, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See supra note 1.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d 386, 395 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976);
United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 1974); Paternostro v. United
States, 311 F.2d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190,
205-06 (D. Md. 1955).
80. 568 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 51
1982] THE FEDERAL FALSE STATEMENT STATUTE 527
transporting more than $5,000' in order to prevent [him] from doing
his duty."'8
This line of reasoning is inconsistent with prior interpretations of
"willful" in section 1001 prosecutions. Willful means deliberate rather
than premeditated or made with bad intent. 82 Moreover, a statement
such as an exculpatory denial is indeed calculated to pervert the
function of the agency asking the question. The maker of the state-
ment seeks termination of the investigation through inducement of
reliance upon the falsehood.
C. Materiality
The majority of courts interpreting section 1001 require that a false
statement be material in order to be punishable under the statute. 83
For the purposes of the statute, materiality is defined as "the intrinsic
capabilities of the false statement itself [to pervert the function of the
agency involved], rather than the possibility of the actual attainment
81. Id. at 1213. Schnaiderman arrived at Miami International Airport from
Caracas. He was not the target of any investigation at that time. While he was
waiting on the Customs line, however, a Customs agent noticed that he had not
completed or signed his customs declaration form. The agent asked him to complete
it. Schnaiderman completed the form answering "no" to the question on the form,
"Are you carrying more than $5,000?" He also answered "no" to the same question
put to him orally by the agent. Schnaiderman was then passed on to a second agent
who, noticing Schnaiderman's nervousness and bulging pockets, asked him to empty
them. Schnaiderman did so, revealing currency in excess of $5000. He was charged
and convicted of violating both the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976), and
§ 1001. 568 F.2d at 1210.
82. See United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 515-16 (5th Cir. 1980); McBride v.
United States, 225 F.2d 249, 253-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1955);
Walker v. United States, 192 F.2d 47, 49 (10th Cir. 1951); Senate Report, supra note
18 at 405; Casenote, Application of the "Exculpatory No" Defense to Prosecutions
Under 18 U.S.C. §1001: United States v. Fitzgibbon, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 655, 659-
61.
83. Senate Report, supra note 18, at 404 ("The vast weight of appellate authority
takes the view ... that materiality must be shown in all prosecution under 18
U.S.C. 1001." (citing Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 878 (1961); Robles v. United States, 279 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 836 (1961); United States v. Larocca, 245 F.2d 196 (3d Cir.
1957); Freidus v. United States, 223 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Rolland v. United
States, 200 F.2d 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953))). Although the
statute contains the word "material," 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976), the Second Circuit
does not require materiality in a § 1001 prosecution. United States v. Mahler, 363
F.2d 673, 678 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Aadal, 368 F.2d 962, 964 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 970 (1966); United States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653, 666 (2d
Cir. 1965); United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452, 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 939 (1962); United States v. Silver, 235 F.2d 375, 377-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 880 (1956); United States v. Pereira, 463 F. Supp. 481, 486 (E.D.N.Y.
1978). The Second Circuit's reasoning is based on a reading of the statute that applies
the word "material" only to the "trick, scheme, or device" clause. United States v.
Silver, 235 F.2d 375, 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 880 (1956).
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of its end as measured by collateral circumstances. '8 4 Even in the
Fifth Circuit, which has construed section 1001 most narrowly, a false
statement is deemed material notwithstanding the government's an-
ticipation that the statement will be false.85
Implicit in the reasoning of courts that have severely restricted the
scope of the statute, however, is that a false answer in an investigatory
situation cannot be material. These courts appear to reason that be-
cause the investigator suspects the declarant of criminal activity, he
also expects the defendant to lie and will not be misled by the false-
hood.8 6 The clearest statement of this position was given in United
States v. Philippe,87 in which the court stated: "The only possible
effect of exculpatory denials however false, received from a suspect
such as defendant, is to stimulate the agent to carry out his func-
tion."88
If the intention of these courts is to adopt a new requirement for
materiality in false statement prosecutions-a statement that actually
perverts the function of a federal agency, not one which has only the
intrinsic capability to do so-they have provided no reason for the
change. If they mean, on the other hand, that a false statement made
during an investigation does not have the intrinsic capability of per-
verting the function of an investigatory agency, their reasoning is
incorrect. A false statement made during an investigation, especially
an exculpatory statement, does have the ability if relied upon to
pervert the function of the agency involved: If the statement is relied
upon, the investigation will be terminated.
III. POLICY CONSIDMATIONS
Contrasted with the strained and semantic arguments used to sup-
port narrow constructions of section 1001 are several arguments that
present legitimate concerns about the fairness of applying the statute
to false statements made to investigators. Many courts adjudicating
violations of section 1001 have analogized these offenses to perjury,89
84. United States v. Quirk, 167 F. Supp. 462, 464 (E.D. Pa. 1958), afj'd per
curiam, 266 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1959); accord United States v. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d
1260, 1266 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980); Brandow v. United
States, 268 F.2d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 1959); Senate Report, supra note 18, at 405; see
United States v. Schmoker, 564 F.2d 289, 291 (9th Cir. 1977).
85. United States v. Johnson, 530 F.2d 52, 54-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 833 (1976); accord United States v. Schmoker, 564 F.2d 289, 290 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1976).
86. United States v. Philippe, 173 F. Supp. 582, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), overruled,
United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452, 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939
(1962); accord Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1962); see
United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
87. 173 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), overruled, United States v. McCue, 301
F.2d 452, 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962).
88. Id. at 584.
89. E.g., United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1975); Paternos-
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which carries the same prison sentence but a lesser maximum fine. 0
Additionally, a number of these courts have suggested that section
1001 prosecutions either fail to comport with the requirements of the
fifth amendment, 9' encourage improper law enforcement proce-
dures912 or overcriminalize insubstantial or technical violations of the
statute.03
A. The Perjury Argument
Presently, perjury is punishable by a maximum five year prison
term and/or a $2000 fine.94 Violations of section 1001 are punishable
by the same prison term, but the maximum fine is $10,000. 95 Some
courts have maintained that because perjury-lying while under
oath-is generally more serious than false statement, Congress could
not have intended that section 1001 apply to unsworn oral state-
ments. 8 Even circuits that refuse to apply section 1001 to investiga-
tro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Ehrlichman,
379 F. Supp. 291, 292 (D.D.C. 1974); United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175, 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Colo. 1953). See
infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
90. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (false statement punishable with maxi-
mum $10,000 fine and/or five years imprisonment) with 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976)
(perjury punishable with maximum $2000 fine and/or five years imprisonment).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc); United States v.
Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See infra notes 102-16 and accompa-
nying text.
92. See United States v. Cowden, 677 F.2d 417, 420-21 (8th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 815-16 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Stoffey, 279
F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Gomez-Londono, 422 F. Supp. 519,
525-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977). See infra notes 117-21
and accompanying text.
93. See Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 1967); Paternos-
tro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Levin, 133 F.
Supp. 88, 90 (D. Colo. 1953).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976).
95. Id. § 1001. See supra note 1.
96. Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1967); Paternostro v.
United States, 311 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1962); see United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d
168, 172 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ehrlichman, 379 F. Supp. 291, 292
(D.D.C. 1974); United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Colo. 1953). As the Levin court
stated:
If the statute is to be construed as contended for here by the United States,
the results would be far-reaching. The age-old conception of the crime of
perjury would be gone .... Any person who failed to tell the truth to the
myriad of government investigators and representatives about any matter,
regardless of how trivial, ... would be guilty of a crime punishable with
greater severity than that of perjury .... A literal construction of a statute
is not to be resorted to when it would bring about absurd consequences, or
flagrant injustices, or produce results not intended by Congress.
id. at 90.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
tory situations, however, agree that the statute covers unsworn oral
statements in a non-investigatory context.9 7 Thus, these courts are
applying the perjury argument inconsistently, depending upon the
function of the particular agency involved. 98 Moreover, the difference
in maximum penalties does not necessarily support the contention that
Congress did not intend section 1001 to apply to unsworn statements.
The broader range of penalties available to the court for a section
97. See, e.g., United States v. Krause, 507 F.2d 113, 118 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975);
Neely v. United States, 300 F.2d 67, 69-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864
(1962).
98. This inconsistent stance is illustrated by courts that have considered whether
to apply the "exculpatory no" doctrine to statements made in reply to questions asked
by different federal agencies. The Ninth Circuit has applied the defense to a state-
ment made to the FBI, see United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir.
1972) (cited as an exculpatory no case in United States v. Ratner, 464 F.2d 101, 105
(9th Cir. 1972)), but not to statements made to the IRS, United States v. Ratner, 464
F.2d 101, 105 (9th Cir. 1972), or the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). United
States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1976). Both Goldfine and Ratner
distinguish between the purely investigative function of the FBI and the regulatory
functions of the IRS and DEA. 538 F.2d at 821; 464 F.2d at 102-05. Similarly the
Tenth Circuit has characterized a Customs agent as an administrator rather than an
investigator. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1980). The
Second Circuit has suggested that it might consider applying the doctrine in the "case
of the citizen who replies to the policeman with an 'exculpatory "no,"' " United
States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962), but
in cases in which the issue has arisen, this Circuit has only once deemed the agent in
question a "policeman." Compare United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452, 455 (2d
Cir.) (Treasury agents not policemen, exculpatory no doctrine not applied), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962) with United States v. Thevis, 469 F. Supp. 490, 514 (D.
Conn.) (FBI agent, exculpatory no doctrine applied), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1293 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
The distinction between regulators and investigators is often unclear. A Customs
official, for example, can at one time be acting in a purely investigative capacity,
while at another he may be routinely distributing questionnaires to travelers entering
the country. Neither the legislative history nor the Supreme Court's interpretation of
§ 1001 supports these inconsistent applications of the statute. The Court has stated
that "[a] statutory basis for an agency's request for information provides jurisdiction
enough to punish fraudulent statements under § 1001." Bryson v. United States, 396
U.S. 64, 71 (1969).
The inconsistency of the perjury argument is further illustrated by the fact that in
several of the cases in which restrictive interpretations have been given to § 1001, the
false statement in question was either given under oath or in writing, and was thus
punishable as perjury. E.g., United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 899 (5th Cir.
1982) (signed tax return); United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 1974)
(affidavit); Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir. 1967) (signed
statement); Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 300 (5th Cir. 1962) (oral
statement under oath); Unittd States v. Philippe, 173 F. Supp. 582, 583 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (same), overruled, lTiifed States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452, 456 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962).
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1001 violation permits a judge to impose a large fine if the violation is
material but the circumstances do not warrant incarceration.
99
Despite the inconsistencies inherent in the perjury argument, Con-
gress, in considering the relationship between the offenses, 00 has pro-
vided less severe penalties in its proposed replacements for the false
statement statute.' 0 ' Such modification, while diminishing the sen-
tencing discretion now available, would in no way restrict the scope of
the statute.
B. Fifth Amendment
A reason commonly advanced by courts in support of their refusal
to enforce section 1001 is that prosecutions for false answers to federal
investigators come dangerously close to violating the fifth amend-
ment.102 These courts have not made explicit the nature of the possible
fifth amendment violations inherent in section 1001 prosecutions;
rather they have based their holdings on the nebulous concept of
fairness. One court explained these decisions as the result of a "latent
distaste for an application of the statute that is uncomfortably close to
the Fifth Amendment."'' 0 3 Similarly, in United States v. Bush 0 4 the
court reversed a section 1001 conviction for false statements to IRS
agents regarding kickback payments. 05 The court emphasized that
99. The Supreme Court recognized this in United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86
(1941), when it stated, in rejecting an argument similar to the perjury argument:
"The matter of penalties lay within the discretion of Congress. Section 35 [the 1934
version of section 1001] covered a variety of offenses and the penalties prescribed
were maximum penalties which gave a range for judicial sentences according to the
circumstances and gravity of particular violations." Id. at 95.
100. Senate Report, supra note 18, at 401-04; House Report, supra note 18, at
182-83.
101. S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1343, 127 Cong. Rec. 9916-17 (1981),
reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 120, at 12,544-46 (class E felony, maximum
imprisonment three years); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1742, 126 Cong. Rec.
9718 (1980), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 20, at 5179-80 (class A misde-
meanor, maximum imprisonment one year).
102. See United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974); Paternostro v. United States, 311
F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
103. United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc)
(dictum).
104. 503 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1974).
105. Id. at 819. Bush, engaged in the business of selling mobile school classrooms,
was approached by two special agents of the Intelligence Division of the IRS, who
told him they were verifying the tax returns of Victor Carona. Carona was suspected
of accepting kickbacks for his influence with the school board responsible for pur-
chasing the classrooms. Bush signed an affidavit which denied that he knew Carona.
Id. at 815. Over one year later, after the statute of limitations had run for the false
statements Bush made on that affidavit, two agents again appeared at his office.
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because Bush had never been informed that he was under investiga-
tion or that he had the right to remain silent to avoid self-incrimina-
tion, he should not be "convicted by his own words given to an
investigating officer of the United States government."'' 10 The court
stopped short, however, of holding that the fifth amendment had
been violated because Bush was not informed of his Miranda rights or
because he was compelled to incriminate himself. 10 7
Despite these expressed concerns, the fifth amendment is not impli-
cated in these cases. A present statement such as an exculpatory no or
a perjurious statement is not protected by the fifth amendment. 08
Both section 1001 and the perjury statute punish the present state-
ment, not the criminal act the maker is trying to conceal. Addition-
ally, as long as the defendant is not compelled to speak, as he is in a
grand jury proceeding in which silence could lead to a contempt
conviction, 10 9 another element of a fifth amendment defense-com-
pulsion-is not present." 0 If the questioning becomes coercive, the
Bush signed another affidavit containing additional false statements, for which he
was convicted under § 1001. Id. at 815-17.
106. Id. at 818. Examination of the affidavits signed by Bush, id. at 816-17 n.1,
compels the conclusion that Bush was fully aware that he was under suspicion at the
time he made them. See id.
107. See id. at 818-19.
108. United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 181 (1st Cir. 1975) ("The privilege
against self-incrimination bars compelled testimony as to past crimes; it does not
shelter new perjury."), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976); accord United States v.
Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969); Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911); United
States v. Pommerening, 500 F.2d 92, 99-100 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088
(1974); Robinson v. United States, 401 F.2d 248, 251-52 (9th Cir. 1968); United
States v. DiGiovanni, 397 F.2d 409, 412 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924
(1968); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955
(1965); United States v. Parker, 244 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 836(1957).
109. A grand jury witness may assert the privilege against self-incrimination, Blau
v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,
562-63 (1892), unless it is " 'perfectly clear ... that the answer [to the question]
cannot possibly . . . ' incriminate." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488
(1951) (emphasis in original) (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898
(1881)); accord Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12 (1964); National Lawyer's Guild,
Representation of Witnesses Before Federal Grand Juries § 13.4, at 331-32 (2d ed.
1981). Unless the witness claims the privilege in response to each question, however,
he may be convicted of criminal contempt when he refuses to answer. Marcello v.
United States, 196 F.2d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. Cahn, 282 F.
Supp. 275, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); National Lawyer's Guild, supra, § 13.8, at 360; see
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1976).
110. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (statements made in
custodial interrogation require warning because custody is coercive) with Beckwith
v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (statements made to IRS in noncustodial
interview admissible, even absent Miranda warnings).
Courts have noted that prosecutions under § 1001 for false statements made to
investigators fall for the most part into the noncustodial category. E.g., United States
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court may determine from the record that an arrest took place, thus
requiring that the maker of the statement have been apprised of his
rights under the fifth amendment.' There is a general duty, how-
ever, to respond truthfully to a question properly asked.1 2 If the
speaker desires, he does not have to answer at all, claiming his fifth
amendment right. He may not, however, "with impunity knowingly
and willfully answer with a falsehood.""13
A minor modification of the statute, such as the inclusion of the
warning requirement included by the Senate in its recently proposed
replacement for section 1001,'1 4 would not unduly restrict its applica-
bility to investigatory situations. The warning requirement would
ensure that no conviction could be obtained under section 1001 unless
the person being questioned was informed that to respond falsely
would subject him to criminal liability.' '5 Although such a modifica-
tion of section 1001 may not be necessary," 6 it would alleviate the
fifth amendment concerns of those courts that have been reluctant to
enforce the statute.
C. Inquisitional Law Enforcement and Overcriminalization
Many courts have expressed the concern that literal interpretation
of the statute may encourage improper law enforcement procedure. " 7
v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gomez-Londono, 422
F. Supp. 519, 523-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.
1977). In Gomez-Londono, the court stated: "[T]he case is one not of the custodial
interrogation of one who is in the focus of investigation and at the point of accusa-
tion. It is a noncustodial interrogation. ... Id.
111. When the interview is a "custodial interrogation," see supra note 110, and
Miranda warnings are not given, even the Second Circuit, which has given § 1001 its
broadest interpretation, will not find a violation of the statute. United States v.
Thevis, 469 F. Supp. 490, 513-14 (D. Conn.), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1293 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); accord United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d
924, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1960) (pre-Miranda decision, defendant "for all practical
purposes ...under arrest," statements not within § 1001).
112. United States v. Gomez-Londono, 422 F. Supp. 519, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977); cf. United States v. Mandujano,
425 U.S. 564, 583-84 (1976) (duty exists in grand jury proceedings); United States v.
Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 182, 185 (1st Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935
(1976).
113. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969).
114. S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1343, 127 Cong. Rec. 9916-17 (1981),
reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 20, at 12,544-45.
115. Section 1343(a) requires that when the statement is oral and made to a law
enforcement officer or a person assigned noncriminal investigative responsibility, the
statement must be "volunteered or . . .made after the person [making the state-
ment] has been advised that making such a statement is an offense." S. 1630, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1343(a), 127 Cong. Rec. 9916-17 (1981), reprinted in Senate
Hearings, supra note 20, at 12,545.
116. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
117. See United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Gomez-Londono, 422 F.
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It has even been suggested that the statute gives "powerful impetus to
inquisition as a method of criminal investigation."11 8 In addition,
section 1001 has come under criticism as a statute that criminalizes
what may be inadvertent or trivial misbehavior. 9 Thus, in Friedman
v. United States,1 20 the court stated that "if we adopt a literal applica-
tion of this statute, anything more than a casual social conversation
with a Government employee would, without warning, subject the
speaker to the possibility of severe criminal punishment."' 21
When improper law enforcement practices may be rewarded, or
trivial misbehavior may be punished as a felony, judicial intervention
is a traditional and proper remedy. 122 Nevertheless, the exculpatory no
doctrine need not be the vehicle for this intervention. Other protec-
tions against overzealous investigation do not require the exclusion of
an entire category of false statements from the coverage of section
1001. For example, when examination of the record leads an appellate
court to conclude that the false statement was improperly elicited, it
may determine that punishment under section 1001 would violate due
process.123 Additionally, when a person is under custodial interroga-
tion, he must be told that he has the right to remain silent. 2 4 More-
over, the Department of Justice discourages routine enforcement of
the statute in cases solely involving false replies to questions of federal
criminal investigators. 125
Supp. 519, 525-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 553 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Colo. 1953).
118. United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 1974).
119. See Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 1967); Paternos-
tro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Levin,
133 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Colo. 1953).
120. 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967).
121. Id. at 366.
122. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966) (statements given
by defendant in custody inadmissible absent warning of constitutional rights; admis-
sibility would encourage use of "third degree"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60
(1961) (exclusionary rule applied because it is the only effective deterrent for illegal
police activity); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) ("real evidence"
pumped from defendant's stomach inadmissible, admission would "afford brutality
the cloak of law").
123. See United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1960). But see
United States v. Gomez-Londono, 553 F.2d 805, 811 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 422 F.
Supp. 519, 524-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
124. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966). See supra note 110.
125. The Department of Justice mandates that a United States Attorney consult
with the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice before he institutes Grand
Jury proceedings under § 1001. United States Att'ys Manual § 9-2.133 (1977); Fiske,
White-Collar Crime: A Survey of Law, 18 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 169, 280 (1981). The
Tax Division of the Department of Justice restricts prosecutions under § 1001 to false
statements made under oath or in writing. United States Dep't of Justice, Manual For
Criminal Tax Trials 55 (1973); Fiske, supra, at 280.
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Any potential for overcriminalization that may be present in section
1001 prosecutions can be removed through a proper reading of the stat-
ute. Two essential elements of a section 1001 offense are that the false
statement be material 26 and that it be made willfully. 21 Properly
construed, these elements ensure that the statute will not be applied
unfairly. Courts such as that deciding United States v. Friedman,2
disdaining the consequences of a "literal application" of the statute,
have instead failed to perceive the significance of these essential ele-
ments of a section 1001 prosecution.
CONCLUSION
The false statement statute should be recognized by all courts as a
valuable part of the federal criminal code. The essential elements
required for a section 1001 prosecution, combined with traditional
constitutional protections and judicial discretion, provide adequate
safeguards against unfair convictions. Minor modifications of the stat-
ute such as those being considered by Congress would alleviate many
of the concerns expressed by the courts that refuse to enforce section
1001 in investigatory contexts. Congressional adoption of, or judicial
adherence to, restrictive interpretations of the statute or the exculpa-
tory no doctrine would unduly curtail the scope of section 1001 by
removing from its reach entire categories of false statements.
John Poggioli
126. See supra notes 1, 83 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 1, 78 and accompanying text.
128. 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967). See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
